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Abstract 
Sequentially observed symptoms in diagnostic reasoning have 
to be integrated to arrive at a final diagnosis. In our 
experiments employing quasi-medical problems, four 
sequentially presented symptoms were consistent with 
multiple diagnostic hypotheses. We tested whether symptom 
order creates biases in symptom evaluation. Early symptoms 
induced a bias towards the initial hypothesis even though an 
alternative hypothesis was equally supported. In two 
experiments, stepwise ratings were prompted to explicitly 
highlight alternative hypotheses. Explicit highlighting 
eliminated the bias towards the initial hypothesis if only two 
hypotheses competed, but the bias remained if more than two 
hypotheses were associated with symptoms in a sequence. 
Our results are consistent with process models of information 
integration that specify how early information can frame the 
processing of later information. Extending previous results 
obtained with fewer contending hypotheses, we show limits in 
impartially considering more than two hypotheses. 
Keywords: Order Effects; Diagnostic Reasoning; Multiple 
Candidate Hypotheses; Construction Integration Theory  
Introduction 
When humans explain observations in their environment, 
they apply knowledge about possible causes and the effects 
that each cause can bring about. Explaining observed 
symptoms by a diagnosis that specifies the most probable 
cause can be difficult for symptoms which are ambiguous 
and thus consistent with multiple diagnoses or inconsistent 
and hard to subsume under a single diagnosis (Johnson & 
Krems, 2001). Imagine the sequential integration of 
symptoms in medical diagnosis in its simplest form: You, a 
physician, become aware of a symptom pointing towards 
different possible diseases your new patient might have 
caught. Bit by bit you take notice of a second, third and a 
fourth symptom. Some of them are unspecific, others 
strengthen your belief in a diagnosis and weaken 
alternatives, but none is decisive by itself. The order in 
which symptoms are encountered can influence the final 
diagnosis because the initial diagnostic hypotheses may 
affect how the subsequent symptoms are weighed and 
integrated (e.g., Chapman, Bergus & Elstein, 1996). If 
symptoms are observed in sequence, the initially 
encountered symptoms trigger diagnostic hypotheses 
(Mehlhorn, Taatgen, Lebiere, & Krems, 2011).  
Sequential symptom processing towards the initial 
hypothesis demonstrates a confirmation bias (Nickerson, 
1998), which would be overcome if all alternative 
diagnostic hypotheses could be considered in parallel. In 
previous studies such impartial symptom integration 
sometimes succeeded for two alternative diagnoses 
(McKenzie, 1998), but doubts have been raised whether 
more than two alternative diagnoses can be considered 
impartially in parallel (Dougherty & Hunter, 2003). 
According to normative Bayesian information integration, 
the order of symptom presentation should not matter. 
Symptom patterns equally supportive of two alternative 
diagnoses should produce equal proportions of these 
diagnoses. However, already updating of a single hypothesis 
can be biased by the order, in which pieces of evidence are 
encountered (Wang, Johnson, & Zhang, 2006). Hogarth and 
Einhorn (1992) specified circumstances under which 
normative updating of a single belief is possible and no 
order effects should occur (e.g. stepwise simple evaluation 
of short and consistent sequences). Yet, models of 
sequential information integration including the belief 
adjustment model of Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) typically 
postulate a disproportionately large influence of early 
encountered information resulting in a primacy effect. 
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When multiple diagnostic hypotheses compete, such a 
strong influence of early information can take the form of a 
bias towards the diagnosis that is most strongly supported 
by the first symptom. The memory dynamic resulting in a 
confirmation bias in sequential symptom integration can be 
described in terms of the construction-integration theory of 
text comprehension by Kintsch (1998) (Baumann, 
Mehlhorn, & Bocklisch, 2007). After observing the first 
symptom, the first construction-integration cycle results in 
high activation of the candidate hypothesis most strongly 
supported by the first symptom. Subsequent construction-
integration cycles start from this state. Thus, initial 
symptoms and preliminary hypotheses frame the processing 
of later symptoms. 
Recently, HyGene (Thomas, Dougherty, Spenger, & 
Harbison, 2008), which models memory processes in 
hypothesis generation for a specified set of symptoms has 
been extended to capture effects of sequential symptom 
processing in detail (Lange, Thomas, & Davelaar, 2012). 
The activations of symptom representations compete in 
working memory as symptoms are sequentially encountered, 
however, framing of symptom processing by preliminary 
hypotheses is not yet implemented in HyGene.  
Our main goal was to study framing of symptom 
processing by preliminary hypotheses and its effects on final 
diagnoses in diagnostic reasoning with multiple candidate 
hypotheses. So, the reported experiments examine 
sequential diagnostic reasoning with four candidate 
diagnoses. Differing from previous studies (Koehler, 1991), 
we will not set a single hypothesis, whose probability has to 
be rated. Instead, participants have to choose among four 
candidate hypotheses. We determine effects of symptom 
order by evaluating proportions of final diagnoses for 
ambiguous symptom sequences, which equally support 
alternative diagnoses.  
Whereas framing by preliminary hypotheses should bias 
towards initial hypotheses, increasing the saliency of 
alternative diagnoses should decrease biased symptom 
processing. We examine both explicit and implicit 
highlighting of alternative diagnoses. Alternative diagnoses 
were explicitly highlighted by asking participants to rate the 
current support for each possible diagnosis after each 
symptom. This procedure constantly reminds participants of 
the competing hypotheses. 
Implicit highlighting of alternative diagnoses was 
attempted by presenting inconsistent symptom sequences. 
Symptoms inconsistent with the initial hypothesis could 
increase the salience of diagnostic alternatives. In terms of 
support theory (Tversky & Koehler, 1994), symptoms 
inconsistent with the focal hypothesis that strongly suggest 
specific alternatives could unpack the complement of the 
focal hypothesis into specified alternative diagnoses. 
Experiments 
Participants were told that they should evaluate symptoms 
of workers in a chemical plant to determine which of four 
chemicals had most likely affected each worker. In all four 
experiments, the diagnostic reasoning tasks referred to the 
same knowledge about symptoms and causes, which was 
acquired in a learning phase. Firstly, participants learned 
which symptoms belonged to which symptom classes and 
subsequently, with which probability each of the four 
chemicals caused symptoms from a symptom class (see 
Table 1). 
Each diagnostic reasoning trial consisted of four 
sequentially presented symptoms after which participants 
had to respond with a diagnosis. Diagnostic symptoms 
pointing more strongly to one chemical also pointed weakly 
to a second chemical. For example, an “Ab”-symptom 
would point strongly to A and weakly to B. In addition, 
there were unspecific symptoms, which were caused with 
equal probability by all four chemicals. These were denoted 
with “x”. Thus, an Ab-x-Ba-x symptom sequence could 
induce A as the initial hypothesis but was ambiguous 
because it contains equal support for A and B. Such a 
sequence is ambiguous, but it is still consistent because all 
symptoms are consistent with both A and B. 
In Experiment 1, we presented such ambiguous symptom 
sequences (AB) together with sequences that more strongly 
supported A (AAB) or B (ABB). The A-diagnosis was 
strongly supported by the first symptom, which should 
result in a higher proportion of A- than B-diagnoses for 
ambiguous AB-items (primacy order effect). In Experiment 
2, participants rated the current support for each of the four 
alternative hypotheses after each symptom. This explicit 
highlighting of alternative diagnoses should reduce order 
effects. In Experiment 3, the procedure was identical to 
Experiment 1, however, inconsistent symptom sequences 
such as Cd-Ab-x-Ba were presented that may implicitly 
highlight alternative diagnoses. Finally, in Experiment 4 the 
inconsistent symptom sequences were presented as in 
Experiment 2 with ratings of all alternative diagnoses after 
each symptom to highlight alternative diagnoses explicitly 
as well.  
 
Method 
Participants Forty (28 female; mean age 23.6, SD = 2.8) 
undergraduate students from the University of Greifswald 
and 39 (30 female; mean age 22.1, SD = 2.7) undergraduate 
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students from Chemnitz University of Technology took part 
in experiments 1 and 2.  
Forty (32 female; mean age 21.5, SD = 2.2) undergraduate 
students from the University of Greifswald and 39 (26 
female; mean age 23.5, SD = 3.2) undergraduate students 
from Chemnitz University of Technology took part in 
experiments 3 and 4.  
 
Material The four alternative diagnoses were introduced as 
chemicals that cause symptoms when they affect workers. 
Each chemical caused symptoms from one symptom class 
(e.g. Eyes) “almost always” (see Table 1). These were 
symptoms with a strong causal link to the respective 
chemical. In addition, each chemical caused symptoms from 
a second symptom class “occasionally”. These were weak 
symptoms for the respective chemical. As shown in Table 1, 
there were two pairs of chemicals. Within a pair, strong and 
weak symptoms did overlap. For example, the symptom 
class “Eyes” was strong for R and weak for B, “Respiration” 
was strong for “B” and weak for “R”. Furthermore, there 
were two unspecific symptom classes that each chemical 
could cause “occasionally”. 
Each symptom class contained two symptoms. For 
example, the “Eyes”-symptoms were “Tears” and “Eyelid 
swelling”. The symptom sequences presented in the 
diagnostic reasoning trials consisted of four symptoms. 
Table 2 shows the item types and the symptom orders that 
they subsume. We constructed each symptom order with 
each chemical in the “A”-role and each possible assignment 
of symptoms. For example, if “W” was the “A”-chemical, 
and “K” was the “B”-chemical for “Ab-x-Ba-x”, one 
possible symptom assignment would be “Rash-Sting-
Paralysis-Swoon”.  
  
Table 1: Domain knowledge participants had to acquire at 
the beginning 
Group Chem. Strong 
symptoms 
concerning 
Weak 
symptoms 
concerning 
Unspecific 
symptoms 
concerning 
Gasi-
form 
R 
 
Eyes 
 
Respiration Circulatory 
problems, 
Pain 
Gasi-
form 
B Respiration Eyes Circulatory 
problems, 
Pain 
Fluid W 
 
Skin Neurolog. Circulatory 
problems, 
Pain 
Fluid K Neurolog. Skin Circulatory 
problems, 
Pain 
Note. The original materials were in German. 
 
In each experiment ambiguous AB-items were presented. 
In Experiments 1 and 2, the additional item types were AAB 
and ABB. AB, AAB and ABB item types contain Ab- and 
Ba-symptoms which both could have been caused by A or 
B. AB items thus are ambiguous, but they are not 
inconsistent. In Experiments 3 and 4, the additional item 
types were CAB and ABC subsuming inconsistent symptom 
sequences (see Table 2). Inconsistent sequences confronted 
participants with a “Cd”-symptom that could not be caused 
by A or B and that was strong for C and weak for D. CAB 
and ABC items are inconsistent and they are ambiguous 
with regard to A and B. 
 
Procedure In all four experiments, participants were first 
introduced to the cover story and then acquired knowledge 
about the chemicals and symptom classes. They studied a 
table of symptom classes and symptoms and were tested 
until they could assign symptoms to symptom classes with 
100% accuracy. Then they studied a table similar to Table 1 
and were tested until they could assign the correct chemical 
or the correct set of chemicals to a symptom-frequency 
combination with 100% accuracy. Then, the diagnostic 
reasoning task was explained and participants were told that 
the symptoms to be diagnosed were caused by exactly one 
of the four chemicals. 
In each diagnostic reasoning trial in Experiments 1 and 3, 
four symptoms were presented serially in the center of the 
screen. Each symptom was shown for 2 s followed by a 
fixation cross shown for 1 s. After the fourth symptom, 
participants were prompted to enter one of the four 
chemicals as their final diagnosis. Then, they were asked to 
rate their confidence from 1 (very unsure) to 7 (very sure). 
In Experiments 2 and 4, the trial procedure was similar 
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except that after each symptom participants rated for each 
chemical how likely it had caused the symptoms seen so far 
on a scale from 0 to 100. These ratings are not reported in 
the present paper. We just consider the effect that this 
procedure had on the final diagnosis. 
 
Table 2: Orders of symptoms related to first (A) and 
second (B) respectively third (C) and fourth (D) chemicals; 
included x stands for unspecific symptoms 
Experiment Item type Order 
1 and 2 AAB Consistent Ab-Ab-x-Ba 
Ab-Ab-Ba-x 
Ab-x-Ab-Ba 
1 and 2 ABB Consistent Ab-x-Ba-Ba 
Ab-Ba-Ba-x 
Ab-Ba-x-Ba 
1 and 2 AB Consistent Ab-x-x-Ba 
Ab-x-Ba-x 
Ab-Ba-x-x 
3 and 4 AB Consistent x-Ab-Ba-x 
x-Ab-x-Ba 
x-x-Ab-Ba 
3 and 4 CAB Inconsistent Cd-Ab-Ba-x 
Cd-Ab-x-Ba 
Cd-x-Ab-Ba 
3 and 4 ABC Inconsistent Ab-Ba-Cd-x 
Ab-Ba-x-Cd 
Ab-x-Ba-Cd 
 
In each experiment, each participant was presented with 
each of nine symptom orders (see Table 2) with each of the 
four chemicals in the A-role resulting in 36 trials in total. 
The assignment of symptoms to symptom orders was 
chosen randomly and the trials were presented in 
randomized order. In addition, four training trials were 
presented in each experiment.  
 
Results 
Experiments 1 and 2 Mean proportions of final diagnoses 
are shown in the top half of Table 3 separated by item type. 
In both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, the proportion of 
A-diagnoses decreased from AAB to AB to ABB items 
reflecting the decrease in relative support of A. Within-
subjects contrasts confirmed this decrease in the proportion 
of A-diagnoses by significant linear trends, F(1, 39) = 
230.84, p < .001, ƞ2 = .86, and F(1, 38) = 474.09, p < .001, 
ƞ2 = .93, respectively. 
Focusing on ambiguous AB-items, equal proportions of 
A- and B-diagnoses each about 50% would be expected 
normatively. In Experiment 1, there was a clear bias towards 
A-diagnoses compared with B-diagnoses for AB-items, 
confirmed by a paired t-test, t(39) = 4.54, p < .001, d = 0.72. 
Thus, we obtained a clear primacy order effect for 
ambiguous AB-items in Experiment 1, whereas in 
Experiment 2, the proportion of A-diagnoses did not deviate 
from the proportion of B-diagnoses, t(38) = -0.10, p = .924. 
Mean confidence ratings are shown in the top half of Table 
4. Space limitations preclude a detailed analysis but it is 
apparent that confidence was reduced for the ambiguous 
AB-items. 
 
Table 3: Means of proportions of diagnoses 
Exp. Item 
type 
A (SD) B (SD) C (SD) D (SD) 
1 AAB .91 (.15) .09 (.15)   
 AB .65 (.20) .35 (.20)   
 ABB .14 (.21) .86 (.21)   
      
2 AAB .83 (.16) .17 (.16)   
 AB .50 (.21) .50 (.21)   
 ABB .09 (.10) .91 (.10)   
      
3 AB .62 (.26) .28 (.19)   
 ABC .60 (.25) .22 (.17) .12 (.12) .06 (.10) 
 CAB .48 (.25) .20 (.19) .26 (.20) .06 (.08) 
      
4 AB .50 (.21) .44 (.19)   
 ABC .45 (.22) .29 (.15) .21 (.18) .06 (.07) 
 CAB .42 (.22) .39 (.17) .14 (.12) .05 (.08) 
Note. Proportions for AB items in Experiments 3 and 4 do not sum 
to 1 because proportions of wrong C and D diagnoses are omitted 
from the table. 
 
Experiments 3 and 4 In Experiments 3 and 4, the 
ambiguous item type AB and inconsistent item types ABC 
and CAB were presented. Note that with respect to A and B, 
the item types ABC and CAB contain equal support as well. 
Thus, normatively equal proportions of A- and B-diagnoses 
should be elicited by all three item types. Mean proportions 
of final diagnoses are shown in the bottom half of Table 3.  
For AB-items the results are similar to Experiments 1 and 
2. Without explicit highlighting of diagnostic alternatives in 
Experiment 3, there was a clear bias towards A-diagnoses 
compared with B-diagnoses (primacy order effect) 
confirmed by a paired t-test, t(39) = 4.94, p < .001, d = 0.78, 
whereas with explicit highlighting in Experiment 4, the 
proportion of A-diagnoses did not deviate from the 
proportion of B-diagnoses, t(38) = 1.02, p = .315.  
For ABC and CAB items, the leading strong symptom 
took effect in Experiment 3. The proportion of A-diagnoses 
was higher for ABC than for CAB items, t(39) = 3.42, p = 
.001, d = 0.47, and the proportion of C-diagnoses was 
higher for CAB than for ABC items, t(39) = 4.12, p < .001, 
d = 0.84. Nonetheless, A-diagnoses were more frequent than 
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C-diagnoses for both item types reflecting the superior 
support by a strong and a weak symptom as opposed to a 
single strong symptom. Despite equal support for A and B, 
A-diagnoses were also more frequent than B-diagnoses for 
both item types suggesting a primacy order effect in ABC 
and a similar order effect in CAB, in which the Ab-
symptom can frame the integration of the later Ba symptom. 
In Experiment 4, there was hardly any effect of the leading 
symptom on A- and C-diagnoses for ABC and CAB. The 
proportion of A-diagnoses was comparable for ABC and 
CAB, t(38) = 0.65; p = .520, and the proportion of C-
diagnoses was even lower for CAB than for ABC items, 
t(38) = -2.02; p = .050; d = -0.46. 
 
Table 4: Means of confidence ratings of related diagnoses 
E. Item 
type 
A (SD) B (SD) C (SD) D (SD) 
1 AAB 5.66 (0.96) 4.08 (1.80)   
 AB 3.77 (1.19) 3.69 (1.29)   
 ABB 4.63 (1.11) 5.47 (1.14)   
      
2 AAB 5.10 (1.07) 4.06 (1.34)   
 AB 3.49 (0.94) 3.38 (1.06)   
 ABB 3.54 (1.16) 5.16 (0.95)   
      
3 AB 4.05 (1.45) 3.36 (1.52)   
 ABC 3.52 (1.45) 3.08 (1.40) 2.83 (1.51) 2.33 (1.35) 
 CAB 3.41 (1.38) 3.23 (1.41) 3.06 (1.52) 2.29 (1.24) 
      
4 AB 4.00 (1.75) 3.80 (1.43)   
 ABC 3.64 (1.66) 3.32 (1.38) 3.32 (1.81) 3.08 (1.60) 
 CAB 3.92 (1.57) 3.39 (1.47) 2.94 (1.47) 3.25 (1.75) 
 
On top of a decreased primacy order effect, which 
increased A-diagnoses compared to B diagnoses for ABC 
items, there was a stronger influence of the last diagnostic 
symptom than in Experiment 3. The proportion of B-
diagnoses was higher for CAB than ABC, t(38) = -3.02, p = 
.004, d = -0.63, and the proportion of C-diagnoses was 
higher for ABC than CAB. B-proportions in ABC could be 
reduced simply because of a primacy order effect favoring 
A. The difference in C-proportions, however, is not open to 
such an alternative explanation and suggests an increased 
influence of the last diagnostic symptom in Experiment 4. 
Mean confidence ratings are presented in the bottom half 
of Table 4 and show that inconsistent symptom sequences 
reduced confidence compared to ambiguous AB-items. 
 
Discussion 
We have investigated effects of symptom order in a 
diagnostic reasoning task with four candidate hypotheses. 
Ambiguous symptom sequences (AB-items) equally 
supporting two alternative diagnoses revealed a clear 
primacy order effect if participants only responded with a 
final diagnosis (Experiments 1 and 3). Consistent with the 
processing assumptions of construction-integration theory, 
the initial hypothesis suggested by the first symptom framed 
the integration of subsequent symptoms. An equally 
supported alternative diagnosis was therefore chosen less 
often. This order effect is in line with the notion that 
alternative hypotheses are typically not considered 
impartially in parallel. Instead, symptom processing 
proceeds with respect to a focal hypothesis if subsequent 
symptoms are consistent. 
Inconsistent symptoms were not an effective means to 
highlight alternative diagnoses in Experiment 3. There was 
still a considerable primacy order effect favoring A over B 
in ABC- and CAB-items despite equal support. Explicit 
highlighting of alternative diagnoses, however, was 
effective. In Experiments 2 and 4, participants rated the 
current likelihood of each candidate hypothesis after each 
symptom and thus were led to consider alternative 
diagnoses. This eliminated the primacy order effect for AB-
items. As noted in previous studies, impartial consideration 
of two alternative diagnoses in parallel can succeed under 
favorable conditions.  
Yet, eliciting ratings of all alternative diagnoses after each 
symptom did not eliminate the primacy order effect if an 
inconsistent symptom pattern added a third and presumably 
even a fourth candidate hypothesis to the set of contenders 
(ABC- and CAB-items in Experiment 4). In these cases, we 
did not only observe an advantage for the alternative that 
was supported by a strong symptom before its equally 
supported rival (A before B), but also an effect of the last 
strong symptom. Forcing the participants to consider the 
current support for all alternatives after this last strong 
symptom before the final diagnosis resulted in a recency 
effect. The proportion of final diagnoses was increased for 
the alternative most strongly supported by the last strong 
symptom for the inconsistent items ABC and CAB in 
Experiment 4. Our results are consistent with process 
models of information integration that specify how early 
information can frame the processing of later information 
(Kintsch, 1998, Baumann et al., 2007). They are also 
consistent with descriptive models predicting order effects 
in belief updating, hypothesis testing, classification, and 
judgment and decision making (Hogarth & Einhorn 1992, 
Koehler, White, & Grondin, 2003) and are a further instance 
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of confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998). Studies with more 
than two contending alternatives are rare. Here, we have 
shown that the number of relevant contenders matters. The 
primacy order effect was overcome with two competing 
alternatives by explicit highlighting. With inconsistent 
items, more than two hypotheses had to be considered. 
Constrained by working-memory capacity unpacking of the 
set of alternatives was incomplete and rather the most likely 
alternatives were taken into consideration (Dougherty & 
Hunter, 2003). 
Our results may not generalize to instances of diagnostic 
reasoning in everyday life, in which symptoms can be 
evaluated more thoroughly without time pressure and search 
for further information is possible. However, there are 
situations, in which incoming information has to be 
processed quickly. For example, physicians evaluating case 
histories are influenced by early emerging hypotheses (e.g., 
Kostopoulou, Mousoulis, & Delaney, 2009). The difficulties 
in considering more than two contenders impartially in the 
present experiments clearly illustrate the limits in diagnostic 
reasoning with multiple alternative diagnoses in similar 
situations. 
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